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U
pon achieving independence, Ukrainians had to 
face a legacy of over 300 years of Russian rule 
over parts of Ukraine. The most difficult question to 
resolve was the degree of distinctiveness of Ukrainians 
in the wake of the long-standing and officially 
promulgated Russian-Ukrainian unity doctrine. This 
doctrine posited a fundamental historical, linguistic, 
cultural and even spiritual unity between Russia and 
Ukraine. One of the pillars of the unity doctrine was a 
specific interpretation of a historical event that 
occurred in the town of Pereiaslav in January 1654. At 
that time Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the 
Ukrainian Cossack council recognized the suzerainty 
of the Muscovite tsar. While historians interpreted this 
event in many ways, Pereiaslav as myth has become 
much more important than the actual event. To some 
extent, attitudes towards Pereiaslav can be used as a 
barometer of the type of identities that exist in Ukraine 
today.
The Pereiaslav myth asserted that the same nation 
had been split by the Mongol invasion and subsequent 
Lithuanian/Polish rule and was “reunited” in 
Pereiaslav. While enjoying currency in imperial 
Russia, this myth was thoroughly elaborated by the 
Soviets, culminating in the celebration of the 300th 
anniversary in 1954.1 The main postulates of the 
Pereiaslav myth were the following:
1. Ukrainians were threatened with national 
annihilation under the yoke of Poland and 
Catholicism.
2. Ukrainians sought to overthrow this yoke and 
to reunite with their Russian brethren.
3. Russians benevolently provided the needed
assistance, thus saving the Ukrainian people from
complete destruction.
Other notions that supported these postulates included 
the following:
1. Russians represented the “elder brothers” who 
were to protect and guide the Ukrainian “younger 
brother.”
2. the idea of Orthodox Pan-Slavism—the 
common faith.
3. an almost mystical appeal to blood relations— 
yedynokrovni.
4. the idea of irreversibility—having chosen 
reunion, nothing can ever separate the two again.
5. the Russian civilizing mission, i.e., only 
through Russia is the way open to progress and 
civilization.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union formally codified these notions in 
1954 by defining the Pereiaslav agreement as a 
permanent voluntary reunion of two fraternal
peoples—a mythology that remained compulsory until
the collapse of the Soviet Union.2 These concepts were
incorporated not only in histories and publicist works, 
but were also included in theater, opera, and 
paintings—all produced to commemorate the official 
celebrations. For example, M. I. Khmelko painted a 
monumental mural, “Forever with the Russian People: 
The Pereiaslav Rada of January 8, 1654.”3 * *
While reviled in the Diaspora, the Pereiaslav myth 
remained compulsory in Ukraine virtually until the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. The only challenge to it 
came from Mykhailo Braichevsky's “Unification or 
Reunification?” which was circulated in the form of 
samizdat in the 1960s. Braichevsky, who criticized the 
official mythology from a Marxist position, ridiculed 
the whole idea of “reunion,” stating that Ukrainians 
and Russians were separate peoples in separate states
1 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “Pereiaslav: History and Myth,” in John 
Basarab, Pereiaslav: A Historiographical Study (Edmonton: The 
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; The University of Alberta, 
1982), xi; Serhii Plokhy, “The Ghosts of Pereiaslav: Russo-Ukrainian 
Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 
53, N° 3 (July 24, 2001), 489-505 (on page 489).
2John Basarab, Pereiaslav: A Historiographical Study 
(Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press,
1982), 179-180.
3 This mural was painted in 1951 and often used as an 
illustration in textbooks and reproduced in art collections, etc.
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that had never constituted a whole. Braichevsky did see 
a “unification,” but not of peoples, rather of ruling 
classes which continued to rule over and exploit the 
masses. He negated the idea of a civilizing mission, 
instead viewing the Khmelnytsky Uprising as part of 
the construction of a bourgeois Ukrainian nation.4
The further deconstruction of the Pereiaslav myth 
by Ukrainian historians came in the 1990s (starting just 
prior to independence). The most dominant trend was 
the construction of a Ukrainian national paradigm. 
These historians denied the notion of “reunion” or 
Russia's civilizing mission, instead viewing the 1654 
agreement primarily as a military alliance. There was 
considerable debate over whether the Khmelnytsky 
Uprising was a War of National Liberation as well as 
the nature and extent of Ukrainian statehood. The many 
works by V. Stepankov, co-authored with V. Smolii, 
the director of the Institute of History of the National 
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, espousing a strong 
national-statist interpretation, could be considered as 
the semi-official position of the historical
establishment.5 Soon the national-statist paradigm was 
criticized by a modernist, Natalia Yakovenko, who 
charged that the Russian imperial mythology was 
merely being replaced in a mechanically Soviet manner 
by a Ukrainian national paradigm.6 Meanwhile, the 
Russo-Ukrainian unity myth continued to hold sway 
among historians in Russia.7
Pereiaslav did not receive much emphasis in the 
media in post-independence Ukraine. It was too much a
reminder of Ukraine's inferior or, to some minds,
colonial status vis-a-vis Russia. In 1992, the former 
dissident and political activist, V. Chornovil, heading a 
newly formed Cossack organization, went to 
Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky and held a new council that 
denounced and abrogated all ties with Russia 
established by their ancestors in 1654.8 But such 
theatrics were rare and those who espoused Ukraine's 
independence touched upon Pereiaslav only in 
response to pro-integrationist forces.
Pereiaslav did remain an important symbol for 
those forces that favored Russian-Ukrainian unity, for 
example, the Communist Party of Ukraine, Russophile 
political movements, and the Orthodox Church of the 
Muscovite Patriarchate. This was already evident in the 
commemoration-celebration of the 340th anniversary of
4 Basarab, 203-210. Also see Mykhailo Braichevsky, 
“Pryednannia chy vozzednannia” [Annexation or Reunion?] in 
Pereiaslavska rada 1654 roku (istoriohrafiia i doslidzhennia) (Kyiv: 
Smoloskyp, 2003), 294-418.
5 Plokhy, 491.
6 Natalya Yakovenko, Paralelnyi svit. Doslidzhennia z istorii 
uiavlen ta idei v Ukraini XVI-XVII st. [Parallel World. Studies in the 
History of Images and Ideas in Ukraine in the 16th-17th Centuries] 
(Kyiv: Krytyka, 2002), 352-353, 360-361.
7 Plokhy, 492-494.
8 Plokhy, 490.
Pereiaslav and the 400th anniversary of the birth of 
Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1994. The Crimean pro-
Russian leader, Yurii Meshkov, held a celebration of 
the anniversary of the Pereiaslav Council. However, 
the link between the Pereiaslav legacy and politics 
became much more apparent in the 1999 
commemoration of the 345th anniversary of Pereiaslav.9 
The newspaper Den' ran a series of articles on 
Pereiaslav, Russian-Ukrainian relations, and the 
ratification of the Russo-Ukrainian treaty of 1997 by 
the Russian Duma. Some authors expressed fears that 
just as Pereiaslav had led to unintended consequences 
and the ultimate abolition of Ukrainian autonomy, so 
the current drive to join the Interparliamentary 
Assembly and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States could have equally disastrous results.10 On the 
other hand, Volodymyr Moiseyenko, a leading 
Communist parliamentarian, complained that the 
Pereiaslav agreement was better than the current treaty, 
because it abolished borders between Ukraine and 
Russia rather than confirming them.11 The discussion 
revealed that while many authors were willing to shake 
off the Pereiaslav legacy a significant number still 
clung to Pereiaslav as the historical symbol of Russo- 
Ukrainian unity.
Perhaps in order to placate such a pro-Russian 
constituency, to signal a more pro-Russian tilt in 
foreign policy, and to please President Putin, President 
Kuchma issued a decree on March 13, 2002, calling for 
a national commemoration of the 350th anniversary of 
the Pereiaslav agreement.12 The decree created a state 
committee of high officials and academics to organize 
the celebration, headed first by V. Lytvyn and then by 
vice-premier D. Tabachnyk, and called for academic 
conferences, popular lectures and meetings, concerts, 
and museum exhibits; it also instructed oblasts to 
develop detailed plans for oblast-level activities 
(Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Mykolaiv oblast 
administrations had posted preliminary plans on the 
internet).13 *While not equaling the scale of the 1954 
celebration, the decree's contents, as well as the 
membership of the organizing committee, indicated the 





12 This document is known as “A Decree of the President of
Ukraine from March 13, 2002, N° 238”.
13 See the rulings, made by the state administration of Kharkiv,
Donetsk and Mykolayiv oblast regarding the fulfillment of 
Presidential decree “Regarding the Fulfillment of a Decree of the 
President of Ukraine from March 13, 2002 N° 238” 
(http://www.regionnet.kharkow.Ua/zakons/211 .html;




The obvious parallels to the 1954 celebrations 
elicited a storm of protests against the president's 
decree. Letters and open letters were published in 
various newspapers and journals, including “An open 
letter of Ukrainian historians, intelligentsia, and 
members of society in response to the danger of a 
political revision of Ukrainian history,” “The Citizens 
of Ternopil alarmed by the President's ukaz,” and, most 
significantly, a petition by the participants of the Fifth 
International Congress of Ukrainianists meeting in 
Chernivtsi, August 26-27, 2002.14 Open letters were also 
written outside of Ukraine. On June 14, 2002, Zenon 
Kohut, Serhii Plokhii, and Frank Sysyn of the Canadian 
Institute for Ukrainian Studies wrote an open letter to 
their colleagues in Ukraine, calling on them not to be 
seduced by the authorities' blandishments to take part in 
this obvious political gambit.15 The letter was widely 
discussed in Ukraine. Similar letters were distributed by 
the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the World Congress 
of Ukrainians, and other civic organizations.16
A lively discussion in the newspapers focused not 
only on the presidential decree, but also on evaluating 
the Pereiaslav event. Again the newspaper Den' 
featured a series of articles in 2002. Serhii Makhun 
concluded that in 1654, without much bloodshed, the 
empire of the Romanovs achieved a great victory—a 
collecting of lands that was subsequently continued by 
the Soviets.17 Serhii Bovkun focused on the 
manipulative nature of the ukaz and astutely predicted 
that an all-national commemoration of Pereiaslav 
would not succeed.18 Maksym Strikha drew the 
connection between the ukaz and the President's 
increasing drift towards dictatorship.19
There were also defenders of the presidential 
decree. The most authoritative voice to weigh in was 
academician Petro Tolochko, a noted archaeologist, 
former vice-president of the Ukrainian National 
Academy of Sciences, and parliamentary deputy. He 
called the president's decree absolutely normal and
14 Information about this resolution is available on the official
site of the International Congress of Ukrainianists at
http://www.mau.org.ua/ukrainian/about/resolutions.html.
15 Press release is available at
www.ualberta.ca/~cius/announce/media/ and
http://www.brama.com/news/press/2003/11/031114cius.html.
16 Press release of Shevchenko Scientific society (July 8, 2002) 
is available at http://www.shevchenko.org/users/shevchenko-cgi/.
17 Serhii Makhun, “Iuvilei Pereiaslavskoi rady: vidznachaemo 
chy sviatkuemo?” [An Anniversary of Pereiaslav: Marking the 
Calendar or Celebrating?] Den’, July 19, 2002 (N° 128). See 
http://www.day.kiev.ua/69451/.
18 Serhii Bovkun, “Pam'iat bez hordosti - khvoroblyva? Tiahar 
radians'koi mental'nosti” [Is Memory Without Pride Pathological? 
The Burden of Soviet Mentality] Den ’, August 3, 2002 (N° 139). See 
http://www.day.kiev.ua/70183/.
19Maksym Strikha, “Uzhodzhennia istorii - pryvilei demokratii,
perepysuvannia ii - praktyka totalitarizmu” [Discussion on History -
the Privilege of Democracy, its Rewriting - The Practice of
Totalitarianism] Kobza, June 12, 2002.
civilized. Tolochko then proceeded to give a 
remarkably standard interpretation of the Pereiaslav 
myth: the close religious and ethnic ties with Russia, 
Ukraine's hopeless situation within the Polish- 
Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ukraine's seeking and 
yearning for Russian support, and how Russia's 
assistance saved Ukraine from certain destruction.20 A 
much more sophisticated defense came from Stanislav 
Kulchytsky, the deputy director of the Institute of 
History of the Ukrainian National Academy. In his 
article “The Three Images of Pereiaslav,” Kulchytsky 
calls upon the protestors to take part in a dialogue by 
participating in the 350-anniversary events, thus 
stimulating a re-evaluation of the essence and meaning 
of Pereiaslav.21
Kulchytsky attempted to give a positive spin to 
what was becoming an embarrassment to the Kuchma 
administration. Opponents of the ukaz had, in fact, 
already begun the academic discussion. Realizing the 
importance of providing reliable historical information on 
the Pereiaslav events, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian 
Studies (CIUS) undertook a number of steps to provide 
such scholarly information to the academic communities 
in Ukraine as well as the public at large.
The CIUS Press promoted John Basarab's book 
Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study, a 
thorough study of the documents of the Ukrainian- 
Russian negotiations, including translations of the most 
important texts. The volume examines the views of the 
most important scholars to write on the Pereiaslav 
treaty from the seventeenth century to the 1970s.22 
Together with the Institute of Archaeography and the 
Shevchenko Scientific Society, the CIUS also 
undertook an active role in funding and producing a 
major volume on Pereiaslav, published in Kyiv by 
Smoloskyp Press. Entitled Pereiaslavs'ka rada 1654 
roku (istoriohrafiia ta doslidzhennia) (The Pereiaslav 
Council of 1654 [Historiography and Research]), the 
888-page volume includes twenty-one articles by 
prominent historians, past and current.23
In order to permit the Ukrainian public to gain a 
deeper understanding of the historical events of 1654 and 
how they have been interpreted, CIUS co-sponsored a 
series of events in Ukraine and even in Russia. In 
addition to supporting and participating in some of the
20 Petro Tolochko, “Komu i chym zavynyla Pereiaslavska rada?” 
[Scorning the Pereiaslav Council? Who? and Why?] Holos Ukrainy, 
August 3, 2002 (N° 140 (2891)).
21 Stanislav Kulchyt'skyi, “Try Pereiaslavy” [Three Images of 
Pereiaslav] Dzerkalo tyzhnia, August 31 - September 7, 2002 (N° 33 
(408)).
22 See John Basarab, Pereiaslav: A Historiographical Study 
(Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; The 
University of Alberta, 1982).
23 See Pereiaslavska rada 1654 roku (istoriohrafiia i 
doslidzhennia) [The Pereiaslav Council of 1654], ed. Pavlo Sokhan', 
et. al. (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2003).
22
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launches of the Pereiaslav Rada book throughout Ukraine 
organized by Smoloskyp, the CIUS co-sponsored three 
international conferences on the Pereiaslav events. The 
first was held in Kyiv in January 2004, precisely 350 
years after the meeting of the council. The conference 
sought to provide a forum for scholarly discussion of the 
Pereiaslav Agreement and its consequences and to 
counter the anticipated official celebrations. Over thirty 
scholars from Ukraine, Russia, Poland, the U.S. and 
Canada participated; the conference was widely reported 
in the Ukrainian media.24 The second symposium, 
organized by the Kowalsky Eastern Ukrainian Institute in 
Kharkiv (March 2004), focused on the question of 
“Myths and Reality.” The third conference met in May 
2004 in St. Petersburg, Russia. The goal of the 
conference was to gather an international group of 
scholars in a Russian setting to discuss various 
interpretations of Russian-Ukrainian relations, including 
the Pereiaslav events. It featured fourteen presentations, 
arranged in five panels.25
What were the results of such intensive efforts? On 
the academic side, much more authoritative material was 
made available on the Pereiaslav council and agreement, 
on seventeenth-century Ukrainian-Russian relations and 
Khmelnytsky's relations with Poland, the Tatars, 
Ottomans, Moldova, and Transylvania. Although the 
various scholars presented a multiplicity of views, not 
one academic work attempted to justify the old Pereiaslav 
myth as expressed in the 1954 theses. Nor was such a 
justification to be found in the mainstream press and 
media. While some newspapers were more pro-Russian 
than others, there was some recognition of the ambiguity 
of the Pereiaslav anniversary.
But what of the grandiose official “commemoration” 
plans? Although the national committee continued to 
exist and new members were even appointed to it, the 
committee de facto ceased to function. It seems that the 
storm of protests caught the presidential administration 
by surprise and, perhaps, compounded by other problems 
in Russian-Ukrainian relations (e.g., the Tuzla events), a 
definite cooling to the Pereiaslav commemorations was 
felt on the official level.
24 Anastasia Khoniakina, “885 storinok nablyzhennia do pravdy” 
[885 Pages of Approaching the Truth] Ukrains'ka hazeta, November 
20, 2003 (N 43 (279)); Viktor Horobets, “Pereiaslav 1654: chy 
mozhlyvo zvil'nennia vid mifiv?” [Pereiaslav 1654: Is Liberation 
from Myths Possible?] Den ’, January 17, 2004 (N 6). See 
http://www.day.kiev.Ua/2004/6/1-page1p4.htm; Iaroslava 
Muzychenko, “Usi dorohy vely v Pereiaslav? Shcho obyrav i vid 
choho vidmovliavsia u 1654 rotsi Bohdan Khmelnytsky, toruiuchy 
shliakh do Moskvy” [Did All Roads Lead to Pereiaslav? What Was 
Chosen and Abandoned by Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1654 While 
Paving His Way to Moscow] Ukraina moloda, January 17, 2004 (N 
8).
25 Zenon Kohut “From Mythology to History: Responding to the 
Pereiaslav Anniversary” in CIUS Newsletter (Fall 2004), 1, 9.
That some commemoration on the highest level was 
considered could be surmised by President Putin's visit to 
close the Year of Russia in Ukraine—a visit that 
happened to coincide with the anniversary of Pereiaslav 
(technically the Year of Russia was over at the end of 
December 2003, not January 23, 2004, when Putin 
formally concluded it). As Moscow TV reported,
Ukraine is celebrating the 350th anniversary of 
the Pereyaslavskaya Rada [a public rally held in 
the Ukrainian town of Pereyaslav in 1654 in 
support of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's 
proposal to form a union with Russia against 
Poland], a symbol of Russian-Ukrainian unity. 
The Russian president will participate in the 
celebration. Putin is expected to arrive in Kiev in 
the afternoon. He will also attend the ceremony 
closing a Year of Russia in Ukraine.
The reporter also noted, “There is nothing in the streets 
of Kiev to remind one either of the 350th anniversary 
of the Pereyaslavskaya Rada, which is described by 
historians as a moment of union of the two countries, 
or about the Year of Russia in Ukraine, or about the 
Russian president's forthcoming visit.”26
While no celebrations awaited Putin, both 
presidents managed to incorporate a few lines in their 
Year of Russia closing ceremony speeches. President 
Putin stated,
The 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Council 
is being celebrated this weekend. This event had a 
great influence on relations between our 
countries, and on the development of our states. I 
believe that it also had a significant effect on 
Russia's development. We talk all the time about 
what significance it had for Ukraine, but I think it 
also had great significance for Russia. I have in 
mind building, state building, and cultural 
exchange between two brotherly Slavic peoples. I 
am absolutely sure and I do not doubt for a 
second that it had a great and positive influence 
on Ukraine's development.27
President Kuchma mused,
...in order to build the right kind of relationship 
with a partner, it is necessary to have an adequate 
idea of him, rather than proceeding from long 
outdated stereotypes. I believe that Russia
26 The remarks by special correspondent of Moscow TV Aleksey 
Zubov can be found on Gateway to Russia site at 
http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art 202683.php.
27 The complete text of President Putin's speech at the closing 




understands this as well as Ukraine. All the more 
so because the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav 
Council is a good opportunity to look back at the 
past in order to build the future of our relations in 
a sincere and civilized way, on the basis of a 
mutual liking between our peoples. Today many 
historical events are viewed differently than they 
were by our ancestors, and this is quite natural. 
But I would like to stress that the documents 
signed in Pereiaslav 350 years ago were the only 
opportunity to avert Ukraine's inevitable defeat. 
Incidentally, back then in Pereiaslav it was 
decided that the Russian-Ukrainian treaty should 
be renewed every year. The parties intended to 
follow and take account of the realities of the 
time. I am convinced that today both Moscow and 
Kiev have mastered this art better than 
yesterday.28
While there were no official celebrations or 
commemorations, those forces that aim at a merger of 
Ukraine and Russia did utilize the Pereiaslav anniversary 
to promote their cause. Thus, on January 17, 2004, the 
Union of Orthodox Communities, the clergy of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, 
and Natalia Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party held a 
Pereiaslav commemorative march from the Uspensky 
Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra to Sofiia Square. 
At the square, the participants prayed for the reunification 
of Ukraine and Russia.29 In Crimea on January 20th a 
bloc of center left political forces created an assembly 
dedicated to the 350th anniversary of Ukraine's 
reunification with Russia (the Pereiaslav treaty). This 
bloc included the Successors of Ukrainian Hetman 
Bohdan Khmelnytskyy, headed by Crimean 
Communist leader MP Leonid Hrach and the Russian 
Movement of Ukraine. These two organizations 
pledged to create a united front in support of the 
unification of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.30 In 
addition, a Sobor (assembly) of the Peoples of Belarus, 
Russia and Ukraine was held on May 17-19, 2004, in 
Zaporizhzhia. Patriarch Alexy II of the Russian 
Orthodox Church called upon the participants of this 
Sobor to remain faithful to the ideas of union
proclaimed 350 years ago during the Pereiaslav 
Council.31
These were the only “celebrations” of Pereiaslav 
that I have been able to identify. For most Ukrainians, 
the image of Pereiaslav proved to be ambiguous. 
Although the official Soviet interpretation touted 
Ukrainian-Russian friendship, in reality it promoted 
inferiority to and dependency upon Russia. This image 
of Pereiaslav had been rejected by Ukrainian 
historians. The Kuchma government's attempt to 
manipulate the Pereiaslav image backfired. Pereiaslav 
as a symbol simply had too many negative 
connotations to be celebrated or commemorated in 
Ukraine. However, the rejection of the Pereiaslav myth 
can hardly be equated with the demise of the Russian- 
Ukrainian unity paradigm. Although, in Ukraine, Pan-
Russian movements have been largely marginalized, 
these forces do have powerful backers in the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the 
Communist Party, and several Russian and Russophile 
groupings. Thus, the Russian legacy in Ukraine will 
continue to be a subject of controversy, debate, and 
politics.
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[Moscow and Kiev Will Solve the Problem of Island of Tuzla, Putin 
is Convinced] Izvestia, January 31, 2004. See the article at 
http://main.news.izvestia.ru/politic/news72094.
29 Ivanna Gorina, “Duma - ne Rada” [The Parliament is Not a 
Council] Rossiiskaia gazeta, January 19, 2004. See this article at 
http://www.rg.ru/2004/01/19/kiev.html.
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